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The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and its successors, the En-
ergy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), and the De-
partment of Energy (DOE), have for the past twenty years been
undertaking numerous efforts with regard to developing the storage
and ultimate disposal capacity for radioactive wastes. There is a gen-
eral consensus in the scientific community, backed up by numerous
studies, that disposal in geologic media is the safest and most fully ex-
plored way of permanently disposing of high level radioactive wastes.
However, problems have arisen in attempting to implement those solu-
tions.
A facility might have been built at Lyons, Kansas, had it not been
for local opposition and some geologic problems that were discovered
in exploring the site. The government shifted to the retrievable surface
storage concept, in which high level radioactive wastes would have
been placed in large concrete mausolea. That program was then with-
drawn, and the federal government returned to the geologic storage
concept, this time proposing that they would have six geologic reposito-
ries in operation starting in 1985. That number was cut back to two,
two or three years ago, and in 1978 the government is re-evaluating the
program once again. The dates may slip. The whole concept may
change. There has been a lot of public opposition to siting of geologic
storage facilities in given areas, and the solution to the problem is going
to require a great deal more in the way of scientific studies, in the way
of state involvement, and in the way of involvement of citizens groups.
* Partner, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, Washington, D.C.; B.S., Amherst College;
J.D., Harvard Law School 1966.
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1,DIOACTIVE WASTES
We have done a lot of work on paper which has been evaluated by
organizations in the federal government, but we still have very little to
show for it.
From my vantage point as a lawyer who represents electric utility
companies with nuclear power plants in various stages of construction,
planning or operation, I view this situation with some amount of alarm.
There have been many studies. The studies have uniformly concluded
that ultimate disposal of high level radioactive wastes in geologic me-
dia, such as salt beds or salt domes, is technically feasible, that the tech-
nology exists today, and that it can be done at reasonable economic
cost. The National Academy of Sciences has undertaken several stud-
ies, the earliest in 1957. The American Physical Society recently re-
leased a report agreeing with those conclusions. The Ford Foundation
prepared a study saying that geologic storage was technically and eco-
nomically feasible. And, of course, AEC, ERDA and DOE have done
numerous studies, all of which have shown that the technology basi-
cally is here today and that all that is needed to be done is to imple-
ment that technology.'
The major problem we face today is one of public confidence and
acceptance of the program. However, more time must be spent in ad-
ditional scientific and technical studies and in developing public confi-
dence by involving the states and involving private citizens. That
additional time, unfortunately, puts the utilities in a Catch-22 situation.
At the same time that people are saying we need a lot more studies, that
we need a lot more public involvement, all of which is going to take a
lot more time, the same people are saying that we cannot proceed with
the nuclear program until we have an implemented solution to high
level radioactive waste problems.
We are thus at a standstill. There are many states, some of which
have been mentioned earlier in the program, in which the lack of a
solution to the radioactive waste problem is either seriously hindering,
or threatening to entirely halt, nuclear development in that state. Cali-
1. See NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY OF THE
REPROCESSING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT PORTIONS OF THE LWR FUEL CYCLE: A TASK FORCE
REPORT (NUREG-01 16) 2.4.2, 4.4.2 (1976); Radioactive Waste Management. Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Environment and Safety of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 141-167 (1976) (Statements of Dr. John Frye and Dr. Robert Frosch) (views of National
Academy of Sciences); S.M. KEENY, NUCLEAR POWER ISSUE AND CHOICES 266 (1977) (conclu-
sions of the Ford Foundation Study); REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PHYSICAL SOCIETY BY THE
STUDY GROUP ON NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES AND WASTE MANAGEMENT 3 (July, 1977); NATIONAL
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fornia is perhaps the best example. The California Energy Commis-
sion recently determined that implementation of radioactive waste
management is not here and is not likely to be here for some time, and
as a result, has recommended that the Sundesert facility being pro-
posed by San Diego Gas & Electric Company, not be built.' In Ohio,
the staff of the Ohio Power Siting Commission has recommended
against issuing a certificate for the Erie Nuclear Power Plant, being
proposed by Ohio Edison Company, largely on the grounds that there
is nowhere that spent fuel can be stored, and therefore the spent fuel
storage pool at the plant will become a de facto permanent disposal
area.3 In Wisconsin, the staff of the Public Service Commission has rec-
ommended against any further nuclear development, relying heavily
on the perceived absence of a solution to the problem of disposing of
spent fuel and high level waste.
II. IMPACT OF STATE REGULATION ON UTILITIES
The impact that this has on utilities is fairly obvious. First of all,
utilities have grown increasingly hesitant to order new nuclear plants.
Largely as a result of state licensing problems, the period of time neces-
sary for a utility to bring a new nuclear plant on line has become com-
pletely uncertain. A utility never knows when filing an application
whether it is facing a state review process of one year, five years, or ten
years, or whether it will ever get a state review process under way. In
California, Pacific Gas & Electric has recently taken the California En-
ergy Commission to court on the grounds that the Commission has re-
fused even to start reviewing an application for a nuclear power plant.4
The lack of an implemented solution to the radioactive waste problem
also tends to undermine public confidence in nuclear power, and this
despite the fact that polls and elections have shown overwhelming sup-
port by the American people for continued development of nuclear
power. In 1976, there were six state-wide referenda calling for one
form or another of nuclear moratorium. All of those were defeated by
an average two to one majority.5 But at the same time, the polls show
that the American people are very concerned that there is no demon-
2. See NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE COMMITTEE, CALIFORNIA ENERGY RESOURCES CONSERVA-
TION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, STATUS OF NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING, SPENT FUEL
STORAGE AND HIGH-LEVEL WASTE DISPOSAL (January 11, 1978).
3. Secretary's Report of Investligation andRecommendedFinding, at 11-14, 20, 21, Applica-
tion of the Ohio Edison Company, Case No. 01-00003 (September 9, 1977).
4. See 6 ENERGY DAILY No. 10 (January 16, 1978).
5. See 4 ENERGY DAILY No. 100 (November 4, 1976).
[Vol. 13:788
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strated solution to radioactive waste.6
The lack of an in-place radioactive waste management program
also results in a great deal of uncertainty as to the costs of nuclear
power. Waste management is obviously a cost of the nuclear fuel cy-
cle, and it should be considered in doing a cost-benefit analysis of nu-
clear power, the same as the cost of air pollution control equipment
must be considered in pricing the true cost of electricity generated by
coal. Right now we have no idea what the cost of radioactive waste
management will actually be. Utilities have consultants who have
done studies, but again they are only paper studies based on their pres-
ent best judgment as to what a permanent geologic repository might
look like and how much the government would charge.
III. NUCLEAR UTILITY PLANNING
The uncertainty also extends to utility planning. Utilities have to
make some sort of arrangements for handling the spent fuel which is
currently being generated in existing nuclear power plants. What do
utilities do? Do they continue to expand the existing spent fuel pools?
Do they go off site and attempt to build new spent fuel pools solely for
the purpose of holding this fuel until the government implements its
policy? The utility really has no way to determine what its construc-
tion program ought to be.
I think a little bit of history might be useful in understanding how
we got into this problem. Until recently, the utilities were led to be-
lieve that nuclear fuel would be reprocessed and recycled. There ex-
isted from about 1966 to about 1972 a commercial reprocessing plant,
the Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS) plant at West Valley, New York,
which did in fact commercially reprocess spent fuel from nuclear power
plants. About that time, General Electric was building its reprocessing
plant in Morris, Illinois. Allied-General Nuclear Services was building
its reprocessing plant in Barnwell, South Carolina. Exxon was talking
about building a reprocessing plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Since
that time, of course, reprocessing has fallen on hard times. The NFS
plant was shut down in 1972 for expansion. As a result of NRC licens-
ing problems, the company has thrown in the towel and has announced
6. Remarks of Louis Harris before the National Environmental Development Association
at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., March 14, 1978. Recently, the League of Women
Voters issued a policy statement stating that "although new LWR nuclear plants might have to be
built, the overall LWR percentage share of U.S. electricity production should not be in-
creased-mainly because of the waste problem." NUCLEONICS WEEK, March 30, 1978, at 12.
1978]
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that they are abandoning the facility. The G.E. plant never went into
operation because the G.E. design, which was using a new process not
used in any of the other reprocessing plants, was not workable. The
Allied Gulf Nuclear Services (AGNS) plant in Barnwell, South Caro-
lina has largely been completed, but has been held up by NRC licens-
ing and by changing regulatory requirements. It sits there today, a 250
million dollar investment, with no hope that it is going to be put into
commercial operation at any time in the near future. Finally, as a re-
sult of recent developments, Exxon has scrapped its plans to build a
reprocessing facility in Oak Ridge.
IV. REPROCESSING SPENT FUEL
Until recently, the utilities had assumed that spent fuel would be
reprocessed. Thus, their only plans were to store spent fuel at the reac-
tors for a few years until it was shipped off-site to be reprocessed.
Reprocessed plutonium and uranium would be returned to reactors in
the form of fuel, and the resource savings of reprocessing and recycling
would be accomplished. The wastes which would result from the
reprocessing cycle were not of any great immediate concern. They
were small in magnitude. The NFS wastes totalled 600,000 gallons of
liquid now in tanks in West Valley, New York. High level wastes from
reprocessing can be solidified using existing technology. As solidified
wastes, they would take up a very small volume. They would, of
course, have to be stored safely. But there was not going to be an
overwhelming bulk of high level radioactive wastes, as people looked
at the problem in the 1970s. There had been many studies, all of which
showed that an ultimate repository could be designed and built with
confidence. The utilities were following this program, but at a dis-
tance. I think they relied excessively on the promises that were ema-
nating from the AEC. They assumed that ultimate respositories would
be built when they were needed. That of course has changed drasti-
cally in the last two years. Now, there are two utility groups which are
very actively pursuing the government, pressing it to act faster. The
industry organizations active in the nuclear field, such as the Atomic
Industrial Forum, Edison Electrical Institute, and American Nuclear
Energy Council, are all vigorously pushing both the agencies and Con-
gress to enact solutions. But in the early 1970s, this was not so much
the case.
In April of 1977, the Carter Administration decided that reproces-
[Vol. 13:788
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sing had to be indefinitely deferred.7 Basing its action on proliferation
concerns, the Carter Administration's decision means that no commer-
cial reprocessing can take place in the foreseeable future. The decision
was taken notwithstanding the fact that foreign utilities, and foreign
reprocessors, were continuing to pursue their plans for reprocessing
and recycling, and notwithstanding the valuable resources contained in
spent fuel that would be in essence thrown away. As a result of the
Administration's decision, the utilities are now faced with a very diffi-
cult problem. Whereas before they were assuming spent fuel would be
shipped to a reprocessing plant and taken care of from there, now the
utilities find their spent fuel pools rapidly filling up with spent fuel and
nowhere to send it.8
Utilities originally designed their spent fuel pools, in essence a
water-filled pool at every nuclear reactor, to hold about one and a third
cores of nuclear fuel. This would allow fuel to be discharged from the
reactor to cool and lose some of its intense radioactivity before it was
shipped to the reprocessing plant. However, now, without any
reprocessing plants to ship to, nuclear reactors are rapidly losing their
ability to take fuel into their spent fuel pools. Eventually what would
happen is that no more fuel would be able to be discharged from the
reactor. The reactor could not be refueled on its annual cycle, and it
would have to be shut down. Considering the investments which utili-
ties have been making in nuclear power plants, and the amount on
which they depend on nuclear power to meet their power needs, this
would obviously be a very drastic solution.
The response by utilities to this problem has been to increase the
storage capacity of the spent fuel pools, not by changing their outer
dimensions, but by increasing the density at which spent fuel is stored.
They have done this by installing different spent fuel racks, and in
some cases by putting in neutron absorbing materials. In many cases
this has taken care of the immediate problem. Many reactors are now,
with densification, capable of storing their own spent fuel until the
1990s. However, some reactors will run out of spent fuel capacity,
even with densification, some time during the early to mid-1980s. Of
course, as other speakers have indicated before, the densification proc-
ess involves an amendment to the utility's NRC license and therefore
7. 13 WEEKLY Comp. OF PREs. Doc. 502-07 (April 7, 1977).
s. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, REPORT OF TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF NUCLEAR
WASTE MANAGEMENT 67 (1978); 1 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, DRAFT-GENERIC
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON HANDLING AND STORAGE OF SPENT LIGHT WATER
POWER REACTOR FUEL 3-6 (Table 3.2) (1978).
1978]
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an opportunity for a public hearing. More and more of these kinds of
applications are being contested. In our firm, we have completed one
such proceeding9 and have two others pending, with heated opposition
by environmental groups and state agencies. One of the cases is being
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.10
An NRC determination on the scope of its licensing responsibilities has
been challenged in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit 1 and this is certain to generate more litigation in the future.
Should some of the court decisions turn out unfavorably, utilities might
well be unable even to increase the capacity of their own spent fuel
pools. This, of course, would bring closer the day when the reactors
would simply be unable to operate any further.
There are other alternatives which the utilities may be able to un-
dertake. One is to ship fuel from one reactor that has a crowded spent
fuel pool to another. This has already been done by one utility. An-
other alternative would be to build a completely separate facility off
site for storing spent fuel, a so-called away-from-reactor facility or
AFR. At the present, such AFR facilities are not available. Such spent
fuel pools did exist at the reprocessing plants. The one at West Valley
has some spent fuel in it, but NFS has announced it will not accept any
more. General Electric has some capacity in its Morris plant, but the
Attorney General of the State of Illinois is fighting before the NRC to
keep G.E. from accepting any more spent fuel. The Barnwell
reprocessing plant has a spent fuel pool which is empty, but AGNS has
said that they will not accept any spent fuel. Exxon, having scrapped
its plans for a reprocessing plant, is saying that it will not build a spent
fuel storage facility at Oak Ridge either.
Another alternative to store spent fuel would be commercial away-
from-reactor facilities. However, a number of problems make it very
unlikely that any commercial entity would decide to go ahead with one.
In the first place, there is no certainty that such a facility would be
allowed to operate for very long. Unless we know when an ultimate
geologic storage facility is going to be in operation, we really cannot tell
what the useful life of a spent fuel storage facility would be. At the
same time, if reprocessing should be allowed some time in the future,
9. Northern States Power Company (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units I and
2), ALAB-455 (January 27, 1978).
10. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, D.C. Cir. No.
78-1269 (Petition filed March 21, 1978).
11. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2d Cir. No. 77-
4157 (Petition filed August 25, 1977).
[Vol. 13:788
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the need for the AFR facility might diminish. So this leaves the utili-
ties with two problems. One is the near term problem of what to do
with spent fuel, and the second is the long term problem of what to do
with spent fuel if there is no reprocessing, or what to do with high level
wastes if reprocessing should be allowed.
For the near term problem, the problem of spent fuel storage,
there really is no dispute as to the availability of technology. Spent
fuel pools exist at every reactor. They have been used for over thirty
years. Long term storage of individual spent fuel assemblies in excess
of fourteen years has already been accomplished. Technical studies
show that there is no reason why storage in a spent fuel pool for twenty
to a hundred years could not be done. But capacity is a problem.
Densification at individual reactors does have a limit, and there seems
to be little, if any, commercial interest in building a separate facility.
Many people have expressed, as a result, a concern that individual re-
actors would be turned into de facto permanent spent fuel storage and
disposal areas. This is one of the reasons that the staff of the Ohio
Power Siting Commission has opposed the application for the Erie
plant that I mentioned before. They are concerned that unless there is
some place to which spent fuel can be sent from the reactor, the reactor
site will become a permanent repository and at least that staff of that
state agency does not want to see a permanent repository in that state.
On October 18, 1977, DOE issued an announcement which at least
on paper would seem to help the problem. 2 DOE announced that it
would accept and take title to spent fuel which has been discharged
from commercial nuclear reactors, and they would be responsible for
both the storage and the ultimate disposal of that fuel. This would be
done on payment of a one-time fee by the utilities. That fee would
cover both interim storage and ultimate disposal. Since that time, DOE
has taken a number of steps to try to implement its policy. One is to
solicit any commercial interest in building a storage facility for spent
fuel. There were some responses. However, no one showed any inter-
est in building such a facility unless they were given government guar-
antees. In other words, the government might as well build its own
facility, because private entities were not willing to take those kinds of
risks, especially when the government was holding all the cards. At
the same time, DOE solicited from the utilities interest in how much
spent fuel and on what time schedule utilities would want to deliver to
DOE.
12. DOE Press Release R-77-017, DOEAnnounces New Spent Fuel Policy (October 18, 1977).
1978]
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Unfortunately, that request for interest seemed to ignore one of the
basic issues which underlies spent fuel and waste disposal problems.
This is the need for an assured solution, not only for the physical rea-
son of having a place to put the fuel, but also for the reason of allowing
state agencies to say that there is a solution to the spent fuel problem,
that we know we can go ahead and allow these plants to be built, be-
cause we know spent fuel will be taken care of in time. Unfortunately,
the DOE budget proposal for fiscal 1978 indicates that DOE may not
intend to do very much. Only about three million dollars has been allo-
cated for interim storage of commercial fuel, hardly enough to do the
kinds of paper studies which DOE has undertaken. Interestingly
enough, DOE was willing to budget twice that amount for interim stor-
age in this country of foreign spent fuel.
For the near term problem, what utilities are really in need of is
certainty. They must have that certainty if the de facto moratorium on
building new nuclear plants is to be lifted. The federal government
has issued numerous policy statements over the past twenty years. Un-
fortunately, because those policy statements have not been carried out,
state agencies and private citizens and environmental groups distrust
them. They greet them with disbelief. One interesting example is in
the Ohio Siting Commission proceeding that I referred to, where the
Commission Staff collected all the policy statements that AEC, ERDA
and DOE have been issuing for the past twenty years, all of which said
that there is a solution to waste management and it is here and we are
going to have it on this kind of time schedule. Obviously that has not
occurred, and because it has not occurred, it is said that such pro-
nouncements should not be believed. So another policy statement by
the federal government clearly is not going to resolve the problem.
From our vantage point, the best solution seems to be Congres-
sional action. Basically what is needed is a political commitment.
That commitment cannot be given by DOE, but it can be given by
Congress. We need a political commitment to a timely solution. We
also need a political commitment to avoid the constant changes in poli-
cies which we have seen coming out of the federal government. What
the utilities need is certainty, and we need it in two different areas. We
need certainty that as of a time certain a facility will be available to
store spent fuel. We also need to know with certainty what the cost is,
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To get a spent fuel storage facility built, on a timely basis, it seems
to us that there are two things that are needed. One is that Congress
must say to the appropriate executive agencies and regulatory agencies
of the federal government, that as of a certain date you will have a
facility in operation. The federal government has often issued an-
nouncements that they will have radioactive wate facilities in operation
by a date certain, but those dates unfortunately come and go. A Con-
gressional mandate of a date would stand on somewhat of a different
footing.
Also we need a solution to the NEPA problem. One of the major
factors which has held up implementation of radioactive waste man-
agement has been the National Environmental Policy Act. 3 The re-
trievable surface storage facility was cancelled largely because EPA
and CEQ said that kind of a program would not comply with NEPA, in
that it was only considering interim solutions and did not examine the
ultimate solution. But if full compliance with NEPA is to be accom-
plished, DOE would have to search the entire country for alternative
sites. It would also have to do an elaborate analysis as to the need for
the facility. That kind of study could get into questions such as the
need for power until the year 2,000, how many nuclear power plants
are there going to be, when is reprocessing going to be available, and
when is the ultimate repository going to be in operation. All of those
kinds of questions would only serve to make a NEPA statement on this
kind of a program a gold mine for litigation, something which would
undoubtedly tie the program up in court for years and years to come.
Another thing that is needed and which Congressional action
could provide is a resolution of the jurisdictional conflict. Right now,
NRC clearly has licensing authority over commercial nuclear facilities.
However, EPA apparently has authority to set over-all standards.
DOE has authority, and of course the states are now asserting with
greater and greater intensity, their right to set standards and regulate,
to say what ought to or ought not to be done. All those factors have to
be resolved if we are to have a facility available on a timely schedule.
As far as the need for a cost certain, there are two ways this can be
accomplished. One is for Congress to fix a cost; this is the fee which
utilities will be charged on a unit basis, for storing and disposing of
spent fuel. A record on which to base such a fee could be developed at
hearings, and that fee could be escalated over time, at least to take into
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976).
1978]
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account cost-of-living increases. The other alternative would be to
have Congress establish a very well-defined criteria so that DOE could
set the fees within Congressionally determined boundaries. This is the
method that is currently used in setting the cost of uranium enrich-
ment.' 4 The fee must also be made a one-time fee, and not subject to
later readjustment as actual costs increase. Otherwise, not only would
we have uncertainty, we would have a total lack of certainty. Unless
utilities know what the fees are going to be, they cannot really fully
evaluate the cost of a nuclear fuel cycle and cannot make the coal ver-
sus nuclear economic comparison.
V. RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL
The long term problem is much more difficult. While I believe
that the technology is fairly well established, I speak as a political sci-
entist and not a physical scientist. But ERDA has put out an extensive
technical report, 5 known as the Technical Alternatives Document,
which analyzes the techniques needed for radioactive waste disposal.
It found that there is an available, demonstrated technology at every
step of the process, from solidification of the high level wastes, to trans-
portation, to placement in a geologic medium. It also found that all
these steps had been tested. What the report showed is that the real
need was the political decision to implement the program. But one of
the difficulties is that people are demanding that there be absolute as-
surance that the project will work, that the technology is satisfactory.
As a legal matter, absolute assurance is not required. The Atomic En-
ergy Act' 6 as interpreted by the Supreme Court,' 7 clearly establishes
the standard of reasonable assurance, not absolute assurance. In any
event, it is difficult to conceive of the kind of testing that one could do
to give absolute assurance that a geologic storage facility would last for
the hundreds of thousands of years that people talk about. But we do
need a solution to the problem. Even more important than having that
solution in place, is to assure people that the solution will be in place.
Once that assurance is somehow disseminated amongst the American
people, much of the opposition that is found in state agencies and inter-
ested public citizens ought to be resolved.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2201(v) (1976).
15. Alternatives for Managing Wastes from Reactors and Post-Fission Operations in the
LWR Fuel Cycle, Energy Research and Development Administration Report 76-43.
16. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011-2296 (1976).
17. See Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union, 367 U.S. 396 (1961).
[Vol. 13:788
11
Silberg: Storage and Disposal of Radioactive Wastes
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1977
RADIOA CTIVE WASTES
One thing which is not often realized is that the same solution
would be needed even if nuclear power had never existed. As a result
of the defense program, very large volumes of nuclear waste have ex-
isted since the 1940's! 8 They continue to exist, and are currently being
stored in underground tanks, double-walled tanks in most cases, in
Hanford, in Idaho, and at Savannah River. This storage is basically
safe. There have been some releases due to leaks in some of the very
old tanks. All of the studies that I am aware of indicate that even with
those leaks there has been no hazard to public health and safety. 19 That
kind of tank storage could be maintained indefinitely, if it were not for
the question of public confidence. Those defense wastes cannot be
made to go away by abolishing nuclear power. Nor can they be made
to go away if the moratorium on new nuclear power plants continues.
And even if no more nuclear plants are built, the existing plants have
already generated a backlog of spent fuel which must be disposed of.
Another problem that has to be faced is what to do with the spent
fuel. Ultimately the wastes from the nuclear fuel cycle will have to be
removed from the biosphere. But if there is some chance that spent
fuel will ultimately be reprocessed by using a proliferation-resistent
system, does it really make sense to put that spent fuel in a salt mine
where its retrieval may become very difficult? Are we throwing away a
resource which may in the future become increasingly valuable, and
should we make that decision now when we have not even evaluated
alternative fuel cycles, alternative reprocessing techniques, which might
meet the President's objections?
VI. PUBLIC ACCEPTABILITY OF NUCLEAR POWER
As discussed earlier, I think the major problem is one of public
acceptability. This raises some philosophical questions as to who is the
public. As I indicated before, there is widespread public acceptance of
nuclear power. On the other hand, there are some environmentalists
and others who are committed to stopping nuclear power, at virtually
any price. And there are also those who are not ideologically commit-
ted to an anti-nuclear world who have serious questions. I think we
18. As a result of military activities from the middle 1940s to the present, the former Atomic
Energy Commission and its successor, ERDA, have generated about 215 million gallons of liquid
high level radioactive waste. This compares with 600,000 gallons of similar waste generated by
the commercial nuclear power industry. M. WILLRICH, RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT
AND REGULATION 2-16 through 2-17 (1976).
19. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RADIOACTIVE WASTES AT THE HANFORD RESER-
VATION: A TECHNICAL REvraw (1978).
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must be clear that the procedures which are established to site and de-
velop ultimate storage facilities for radioactive wastes ought not to be
tailored to those persons who are ideologically opposed to nuclear
power. For they will never be convinced. The procedures ought to be
tailored to those people with legitimate public interests, and to state
agencies. Somehow, these people must be brought into the process.
A number of possible techniques have been suggested. One is the
science court, where an independent group of scientists would be estab-
lished, weigh the evidence, and reach a verdict. This procedure in fact
has already been applied. I think the studies by the National Academy
of Science, by the American Physical Society, by the Ford Foundation,
all of which were made by people essentially disinterested in nuclear
power, all concluded that geologic disposal was appropriate. Another
recent suggestion has been the negotiated settlement, setting up a panel
of mediators, people from the industry, people from nuclear opposi-
tion, people from government, and letting them negotiate a resolution
to the problem. There was a recent project done on coal mining using
this process. It worked reasonably well. However, as soon as that re-
port came out, those environmentalists who were not included for one
reason or another in the project, criticized the results as giving away too
much, as retreating from prior environmentalist victories.2 0 Here too
there may be no easy way out.
However, it seems to me, since we are dealing with a political as
much as a technical problem in the siting of a long-term repository,
again we need a clear Congressional commitment. We need Congress
to establish time limits, both for DOE to come in with a program, one
that is not going to change, and for that program to proceed to the
selection of a site and construction of a facility. It would certainly be
very helpful if at Congressional hearings, representatives of those states
who would welcome a repository for nuclear wastes in their states,
would come forward and say so. Schemes such as financial incentives
offered to states would also be considered. But somehow we have to
get around the parochial state attitudes which have surfaced in some
cases.
As an example, a bill passed last year in the state of Minnesota,
and Minnesota is a state which has three operating nuclear reactors and
depends on nuclear power for much of its electric generation, said no
nuclear waste generated in this state may be permanently stored in this
20. See 6 ENERGY DAiLY No. 29 (February 10, 1978), No. 52 (March 16, 1978).
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state, and Minnesota will not take nuclear waste from any other state.21
In other words, the Minnesota legislation in effect says, "We won't take
your waste, and you have to take our waste." Somehow that kind of
attitude has to be dealt with. We also have to, through Congressional
action, do away with the repetitive policy evaluations. Every time a
new Administration takes office, every time new people take over at
AEC or at ERDA or at DOE, there seems to be an obligation to bring
in a new group of people and study the problem all over again. By this
time we have developed rooms full of studies, but no facilities. Some-
how that has to be either stopped or slowed down. The decision has to
be made. It is a hard political decision, but that decision has to be
made and it has to be implemented.
VII. CONCLUSION
I think the final thing we must avoid is the "solution" that the
nuclear opponents would favor. Their answer would be to not have
any more nuclear plants until there is a solution in existence to the
waste management problem. And at the same time, we must not wait
to implement a solution to the waste management problem until all
conceivable studies have been done. That kind of paralysis does dis-
service to everyone, and certainly is not in the best interests of this
country.
21. Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 416, 1977 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. (West) 1066 (codified at MNin.
STAT. ANN. §§ 116C.71-.74 (West Supp. 1978).
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